






“The Production of Transparency: Hölderlinian Practices”
Abstract
This essay explores the idea that the last, post-1806, Hölderlin is a speculative poet, a poet that achieves the transparent inscription of a neutral nature to which speculation as such aspires. I compare Hölderlin’s project at this period to the Deleuzian conception of perversity in the Logic of Sense, arguing that the poems map a new regime of sense by means of three perverse practices: desubjectivation, intemporalisation and abstraction (or the creation of phantasms). I consider each of these practices in turn in terms of Hölderlin’s own attitude as well as the poems themselves. What emerges is a series of concepts that characterise Hölderlinian speculation: the window, the asylum, secular time, measureless wonder, utopia and the specularised death drive.
Keywords: speculation, window, death, asylum, secularity, utopia, Hölderlin

1.	Paradise Now!
What marks out speculation as a distinctive practice is its affirmation (immediate or otherwise) of the principle, “Something can now be described.” It is now possible, according to the impatient speculative stance, to achieve some form of textual clarity; hence, the speculative text is characterised by graphic transparency (however momentary or partial). The idealist tradition conceives this speculative project in terms of mirrors: reflective mirrors through which one sees darkly and “magical and symbolic mirror[s]”​[1]​ that speculate clearly. The idealist task is, first, to diagnose the failures inherent in a reflective form of mirroring and then to articulate the conditions for the production of genuinely speculative mirrors (“the formation of the speculative”​[2]​).
	That is, in Spring 1801, F.W.J. Schelling and G.W.F. Hegel began the project of absolute idealism, central to which was the critique of contemporary philosophy as “reflective” and the assertion of a new “speculative standpoint.” The images of both reflection and speculation gain their sense from the workings of the mirror: its ontology of original and image (which both is and is not the original) and its evaluative criteria of fidelity (seeing face-to-face) and inaccuracy (seeing darkly).​[3]​ The description of thought as mirror (while traditional) takes on a new urgency from 1801 onwards in the task of differentiating between two types of mirror: the narcissistic, reflective mirror of subjective idealism (Fichte) and the magical, speculative mirror that Schelling and Hegel attempt to silver.​[4]​ Thus, German Idealism – in both its subjective and absolute forms – can be characterised through its commitment to the logic of the mirror​[5]​, where what is glimpsed in the speculative mirror is not just the philosopher gazing in, but the totality of reality. 
As the above implies, key to this idealist tradition, in the wake of Hamann and Herder’s meta-critique, is the realisation that concretely it is the philosopher, her writing practices and the resultant text which assume the place of the mirror. It is for the philosopher to write in such a way that reality is speculatively (i.e. transparently) inscribed; it is for the philosopher to become the appropriate kind of silvered surface. The question for the idealist therefore runs: how does one become a speculative philosopher? What practices and exercises are required to transform oneself and one’s writing from a reflective to a speculative state? In other words, in what do speculative forms of life – as well as transparent texts – consist?




To deploy Hölderlin in the context of “the great outdoors” smacks, of course, of recklessness if not downright perversity, for does not Hölderlin exemplify the aesthetics of correlation? Does not his piety – expiring “the breath of the coming of the holy”​[11]​ – prevent him from playing mascot to speculation? Thus, Harman asserts,

[Both Husserl and Lovecraft] revive a metaphysical speculation that embraces the permanent strangeness of objects. If philosophy is weird realism, then a philosophy should be judged by what it can tell us about Lovecraft. In symbolic terms, Great Cthulha should replace Minerva as the patron spirit of philosophers, and the Miskatonic must dwarf the Rhine and the Ister as our river of choice. Since Heidegger’s treatment of Hölderlin resulted mostly in pious, dreary readings, philosophy needs a new literary hero.​[12]​

And yet it is my contention that the last Hölderlin resists such dreariness – and certainly any piety. He gives voice to a genuinely speculative form of life, marvelling before “the permanent strangeness of objects.” This is certainly not to propose a logic of anticipation: Hölderlinian speculation is, I am contending, sui generis​[13]​; nevertheless, it still reveals particularly clearly the singular conditions that make speculation as such possible. That is, I use Hölderlin’s poetry as an exemplar to unearth the various practices required to inscribe the transparent. Hölderlin acts in what follows as a figure for the constitution of a peculiar yet paradigmatic speculative form of subjectivity; an alternative answer to that idealist question, how does one become a speculative philosopher?


2.	The Robinsonade of the Tübingen Tower
Moreover, if “Hölderlin” is one designation for these specific set of practices that make speculation possible, “pervert” is another. Indeed, only perverts speculate. And this is because it is the pervert who breaks down the habits and structures of subjectivity to experiment with new, asubjective domains of sense. For Deleuze in the Logic of Sense, perversion is to be defined as follows, “The world of the pervert is a world without Others, and thus a world without the possible.”​[14]​ Alone in Zimmer’s attic, fending off the constant stream of visitors with “ostensible reserve and hyperbolic humility,” (Marion 135) “as if he thereby wanted to deliberately keep his distance from everyone,”​[15]​ Hölderlin establishes his own Esperanza – the uninhabited island of Tournier’s Friday that will be a constant reference point in what follows. He practises a rigorous “hermiticism” (whether pathologically or not, it does not here matter​[16]​), and so gives birth to a world-without-Others. His is a perverse if “fantastic deviation from our world” (Deleuze 343) where the breakdown of the habits of common life (the structure of a world with Others) leaves space for alternative processes of meaning-formation to emerge. Indeed, the adventure of all perversion – Hölderlin’s, Robinson’s or Antisthenes’ – is distilled in the question, “What happens when Others are missing from the structure of the world?” (345) And for Deleuze, what happens is the emergence of the surface: both its rediscovery after the obscuration by height (conversion) and depth (subversion), but also its genesis. It is for this reason Deleuze calls perversion “an extraordinary art of surfaces.” (151) To be perverse – and so, on my reading, to speculate – one must be proficient in superficiality. 
As I will argue, Hölderlin’s last poems map a new regime of sense. More concretely, there are three perverse practices out of which such deviant, if transparent maps are formed: desubjectivation, intemporalisation and abstraction (or the creation of phantasms). Perverse desubjectivation consists in the production of a “neutral” realm which “liberates the a-cosmic, impersonal and pre-individual singularities which had been imprisoned.” (244) Such a neutralised world-without-Others is, moreover, a world without the category of the possible, leaving solely the inert present – the sheer, perpetual repetition of “an unbearable light.” (345) “There are no longer any transitions” in a world without Others: no transitions from the past to the future, no “what comes before and what comes after in time.” (346, 350)​[17]​ This is a specifically perverse temporality: “intemporality.” Finally, desubjectivation and intemporalisation are co-ordinated to the end of phantasm-creation, releasing singularities proper to the surface. A process of reduction or abstraction takes place in which each thing is “reduced to its harshest lines.” (345) Deleuze concludes,

The absence of the Other and the dissolution of its structure do not simply disorganise the world, but, on the contrary, open up a possibility of salvation… The pure surface [thus revealed] is perhaps what Others were hiding from us. It is perhaps at the surface, like a mist, that an unknown image of things is detached and, from the earth, a new surface energy without possible others. (354)

My contention is that something similar holds true for the last Hölderlin.


3.	A Poetics of Immanent Joy

Der Sommer
	Im Thale rinnt der Bach, die Berg’ an hoher Seite,
	Sie grünen weit umher an dieses Thales Breite,
	Und Bäume mit dem Laube stehn gebreitet,
	Daß fast verbogen dort der Bach hinunter gleitet.

	So glänzt darob des schönen Sommers Sonne,
Daß fast zu eilen scheint des hellen Tages Wonne,
Der Abend mit der Frische kommt zu Ende,




Wenn aus der Tiefe kommt der Frühling in das Leben,
Es wundert sich der Mensch, und neue Worte streben
Aus Geistigkeit, die Freude kehrt wieder
Und festlich machen sich Gesang und Lieder.

Das Leben findet sich aus Harmonie der Zeiten,
Daß immerdar den Sinn Natur und Geist geleiten,
Und die Vollkommenheit ist Eines in dem Geiste,
So findet vieles sich, und aus Natur das Meiste.​[19]​

The above is some of the very last poetry Hölderlin wrote (his Scardanelli-poetry). To begin, I enumerate its typical features​[20]​:
a.	First, like all the Scardanelli-poetry and many of the poems that precede it, these two poems are eight lines long, structured in blocks of four lines. 
b.	They are written in an iambic metre with six feet – a metre which, as Lübbe-Grothues points out (91), is “new” to the last poems.
c.	Each line terminates in “often dull, often stereotypical rhymes”​[21]​ – in the case of the above Der Sommer and Der Frühling, rhyming couplets (sometimes the last poems use ABAB or even ABBA rhyme schemes as well). 
d.	“The present indicative is overwhelmingly dominant.” (Lübbe-Grothues 91) Indeed, one struggles to find any other temporal mode being employed at all in any of the 47 poems written after 1806. According to Jakobson, there is a “strict monopoly of the unmarked present tense.” (130)
e.	“There is an absence of pronouns in the first and second person, of imperatives, questions, addresses or exclamations.” (Lübbe-Grothues 91) The poems consist almost entirely in constative assertions in the third-person without any reference to the speaking-subject or the addressee. In other words, there is no reference to the fact that the poem is written by someone and for someone. 
f.	The poems also lack deictic references, indexicals that point to a specific place or time (like “here” or “now”). In Jakobson’s words, the poems are “characterised by their suppression of every allusion to the speech act and its date as well as to the actual participants.” (131) They refuse to countenance the fact of an outside that would anchor them in the space-time of lived experience, instead generating what Jacobson calls “absolute” or “introvertive” semiosis. (132)​[22]​
g.	The poems contain neither names nor any reference to individuals (or even species of animals). They are “people-less.” (Böschenstein 46) There is a complete absence of any reference to events, eras or individuals at all. Der Sommer, for instance, could be a poem by any poet about any landscape at any epoch. These poems are “curiously impersonal”​[23]​ – purely abstract entities, independent of particular places and times. 
h.	The most frequent verbs in the last poems are “sein” (to be) and forms of “scheinen” and “sich zeigen” (to appear) – affirmative verbs which are almost never negated.​[24]​ 
i.	The most frequent nouns are “Mensch”, time-words (“Jahr”, “Tag” etc), types of natural feature (“Feld”, “Berg” etc) and affirmatory substantives (“Hohe”, “Freie”, “Helle”, “Freude”, “Friede”, “Gute”, “Beste”) – all of which “show a tendency to abstraction.” (Lübbe-Grothues 92)
Lübbe-Grothues draws the following conclusions for Hölderlin’s last poetics from such features:

(1) In the elimination of the first and second person and in the deletion of those poetic characteristics that are dialogic and situated, the poems are shown to be monologues. 
(2) The omission of all individual, determinate concepts, leaving only substantives and philosophical concepts, can be seen as a tendency to the general and a form of abstraction. 




Pure, immediate affirmation is fundamental here. Hence, the tone of Hölderlin’s last poems is cheerful. They describe a landscape of fulfilment and ease. The last Hölderlin’s guiding maxim reads, “Die Vollkommenheit ist ohne Klage.”​[25]​ The prologue to Wenn aus dem Himmel articulates this fully,
	
Wenn aus dem Himmel hellere Wonne sich
Herabgießt, eine Freude den Menschen kommt,
Daß sie sich wundern über manches
Sichtbares, Höheres, Angenehmes:
Wie tönet lieblich heiliger Gesang dazu!
Wie lacht das Herz in Liedern die Wahrheit an,
Daß Freudigkeit an einem Bildniß…​[26]​

Elsewhere I have described these lines as a manifesto for the last works (“Hölderlin’s Atheisms” 413): humanity here feels amazement, not at the heavenly bliss that has descended, but at what is immanent (the “Sichtbares”); the joy experienced is no longer the holy drunkenness of the hymns and elegies, but a joy proper to humanity – a celebration of the finite. The poems perform the very affect assigned to the townsfolk of Brot und Wein who “satt gehn heim von Freuden des Tags zu ruhen.”​[27]​
Similarly, the radiance of the summer sun in Der Sommer (lines 1–6 above) is not characterised as a transcendent source, but identified with the becoming-perfect of the natural and human world. Constantine helpfully describes such light, which is a constant feature of these poems, as “the visible vehicle of an immanent joy” (310): affirmation and perfection are here tightly bound to the celebration of immanence. Terminology that commonly evokes transcendence in Hölderlin’s earlier work – “Götter”, “Heilige”, “Liebe” – entirely disappears after 1806 (Böschenstein 38–9; Lübbe-Grothues 95). The fragment, Freundschaft, Liebe…, does depict, it is true, humanity getting on with a life involving religious ceremonies, but it shows no concern for their divine meanings. (FA 9, 70) Religious paraphernalia is part of immanent life (celebrated now as it is, not for the joys the gods could bring). Freundschaft, Liebe is indifferent to transcendence.




The inscription of this plenitude is achieved through a process of desubjectivation. I have already noted the absence of deixis, names, historical dates or places. In sum, the context of the utterance (its character as speech-act) is effaced, and along with it the speaking subject. The radicality of the last poems in this regard needs to be emphasised: not only are the poems free from self-conscious reflection on their own status as poems, consciousness itself is effaced. Poems like Der Sommer and Der Frühling consist in a continuous mechanical rearranging of stock-images and rhymes. This is machinic poetry; the products of an “automatic and auto-referential text-machine.” (Philipsen 72)​[31]​ And it is precisely owing to the above that Philipsen speaks of its “absolute I-lessness” or “inhuman, unflinching superficiality.” (65, 24) The speaking “I” is not merely neglected; rather its suppression is the necessary condition for the poems to emerge in the first place. Hölderlin’s last poems are premised on the prior completion of an “ars oblivionis.” (Philipsen 28)​[32]​
The most visible of Hölderlin’s speculative practices after 1806 is therefore self-extinction. The observation that concludes In lieblicher Blau, “Leben ist Tod, und Tod ist auch ein Leben,”​[33]​ is, I am contending, equivalent to Apollinaire’s Lyotardian insistence that “More than anything, artists are men who want to become inhuman”​[34]​ or Nietzsche’s Brassierian principle, “The living creature is simply a kind of dead creature, and a very rare kind.”​[35]​ It is here that the contemporary stakes of Hölderlinian speculation are most apparent, for the above takes us straight to the heart of Brassier’s Nihil Unbound, that programmatic statement of the epistemic exercises needed to extinguish thought, become perverse and so speculate. 
While Brassier may begin Nihil Unbound with the “speculative opportunity” provided by the realisation that “thinking has interests that do not coincide with those of living” (xi), by the final chapter it has become clear that the stakes are much higher: thinking has interests that do not coincide with thinking. Thinking can occur only on condition of self-extinction. That is, the possibility of a speculative philosophy is to be located only by asking the questions, “How does thought think a world without thought? Or more urgently: How does thought think the death of thinking?” (223) Read through the Freudian death drive in which the organism repeatedly kills itself to shield itself​[36]​, Brassier infers that thought must kill itself to survive – and what is more it does. Speculation occurs under “a figure of death” (222–3), and philosophy becomes one more tool for killing thought – an “organon of extinction”, as the last words of Nihil Unbound put it (239).​[37]​
I have already drawn attention to modalities of self-extinction within the last poems themselves; however, this poetics of I-lessness is made possible by more general practices in Hölderlin’s post-1806 life as a whole. Here too Hölderlin extinguishes his subjective voice, and it is partly this practice that gives rise to the I-less inscription of the transparent in his poetry of the period. In effect, Hölderlin withdraws. He enacts a becoming-hermit to shield himself from the intersubjective world, donning a series of dead “masks.” (Philipsen 45)​[38]​  Whether diagnostically correct or not, it was these masks that the physicians who treated Hölderlin in 1806 classified as “a pathological torpidity, a complete inability to react… a catatonic stupor.” (Bertaux “Was Hölderlin Mentally Ill?” 355) Hölderlin appears to visitors as a spectre. The forms of politesse with which he greeted and thus alienated visitors are well-known – “a tried-and-tested method of keeping people at a distance from oneself,” as his landlord, Zimmer, reported.​[39]​
	The figure of the asylum, which emerges in Hölderlin’s poetry during the first years of the nineteenth century, provides the appropriate trope to describe such hermitic practices. Hölderlin’s 1805 translation of the Pindaric fragment, Die Asyle, ends,
		
[Themis] aber hat
Die goldgehefteten, die gute,
Die glänzendbefruchteten Ruhestätten geboren.​[40]​

A world-without-Others is the equivalent of an asylum, and it is precisely such an enclosed domain (ab-solute, in its etymological sense) that Hölderlin/Pindar here idealises as “glänzendbefruchteten.” Moreover, the end to which such fertiliser is put is made clearer in the commentary:

Themis, die ordnungsliebende, hat die Asyle des Menschen, die stillen Ruhestätten geboren, denen nichts Fremdes ankann, weil an ihnen das Wirken und das Leben den Natur sich konzentrirte, und ein Ahnendes um sie, wie erinnernd, dasselbige erfähret, das sie vormals erfuhren.​[41]​





And thus we return again to the world-without-Others, the self-made desert island/asylum in which “fantastic” experiments with sense can occur. Tournier’s Friday describes one such experiment: the passage of Robinson Crusoe from empty body-without-organs wedded to the earth, through unstable periods of oscillation between cultivated reterritorialisation and deterritorialising lines of flight, to the point where – under the unconscious tutelage of Friday – Robinson becomes an aerial, solar surface through which intensities pass and momentarily express themselves. On the threshold of this final transformation, Robinson reflects,

What has most changed in my life is the passing of time, its speed and even its direction. Formerly every day, hour and minute leaned in a sense toward the day, hour and minute that was to follow… Perhaps the sweep of time of which I was a part, after winding through millennia, would have “coiled” and returned to its beginning. But the circularity of time remained the secret of the gods, and my own short life was no more than a segment, a straight line between two points aimed absurdly toward infinity… Yet there are portents which offer us keys to eternity. There is the calendar, wherein the seasons eternally complete their cycle on a human scale, and even the modest circle of the hours.
For me the cycle has now shrunk until it is merged in the moment. The circular movement has become so swift that it cannot be distinguished from immobility… Each [day] stands separate and upright, proudly affirming its own worth.​[43]​

Robinson here identifies three structures of temporality: first, a human form of linear time in which moment follows on moment in a “straight line” that recurs ad infinitum; second, a divine time which is circular, the end coiling back to the beginning; third, a post-human time of the moment, in which circular time compresses itself to the limit of the infinitely small, so that it seems almost immobile: each one of these moments becomes self-contained and self-affirming (ab-solute). It is worth noting the relation between divine and post-human time: the former consists in cycles that exceed all possible human experience; the latter shrinks these cycles into the very atoms of experience. One might even speak of the latter as a (perverse) secularisation of divine time to the extent that it repeats the cycle immanently. Moreover, Friday also describes a fourth time which Robinson momentarily forgets (although he returns to it a paragraph later), this is “escap[e] into timelessness” or “eternity”: the forgetting of time associated in the novel with the pigs of the swamp (ancestors of Nietzsche’s forgetful cows). (204) This timelessness is of course not only the preserve of semi-conscious beasts, but also a deity who exists outside of time. The divine has two times: everlasting cycles and atemporal stasis.
	Robinson goes on to critique the neuroses associated with human time ticking on and on without end; he also rejects the longing for eternity as illusory. Rather, at this late stage in the novel Robinson finds himself whole-heartedly affirming the post-human time of the moment. He describes the new form of comportment that has come over him as he experiences this “revolutionary” (205) temporal structure:





I watch Friday as he walks towards me… and the emptiness of sea and sky is so vast that I have no scale by which to measure him, so that he might be a figure three inches high within reach of my hand or a ten-foot giant half a mile away. (205)

The experience of post-human time has two consequences. First, it gives rise to a new mode of attention or concentration on the part of the subject: the subject attends closely but also marvels as if seeing the object for the very first time. It is a moment of critical innocence, or (to resist Ricoeur) ahermeneutic naivety. Second, integral to this innocent marvelling is a loss of measure: there is no longer any way to determine objects by a pre-given standard; there is no longer any means for comparison. The gaze of wonder does not measure.
I want to argue that Tournier’s description of a time of the self-contained moment provides a key to unlock the temporal structure of Hölderlin’s last poems, which likewise shift away from a human or divine time to a time of the moment. Each of these last poems celebrates a different but equally perfect moment in time – self-contained and self-affirming; it exhibits the possibility of a time without transition, a time independent of difference (and even différance). Bertaux’s comments can serve as a guiding motif: “The fifty or so poems which remain of [Hölderlin’s] productions from the era of the tower are of a style and tone totally different from the high style of the preceding phase: infinitely simple and sparse, almost naïve and intemporal.” (Le temps d’un poète 331) He goes on to expand on this notion of intemporality: “What is at issue is another temporal dimension than that of human agitation, the historical dimension of dates; [Hölderlin] rediscovers the cyclic time of agrarian civilisations.” (331) Earlier comments also shed light on the notion:

[During this phase, Hölderlin] shuts up… he integrates himself into the landscape, while his body is reduced to the earth. It lives the rhythm of the seasons. Duration is abolished. Around him exist solely the elements, the breath of air, light and water… Around him, life is renewed. (324)

Bertaux’s identification of the intemporal closely maps Tournier’s description of a post-human time. There is the same refusal to think time as passing away, a refusal to think it in terms of a series of linear presents: “Duration is abolished”. And as a consequence, Bertaux’s Hölderlin comports himself in his poems in a marvelling and naïve manner. This is a time of perpetual beginning, but simultaneously a time of perpetual perfection. Every new moment stands alone, complete and radically new. Böschenstein calls this a “despotism of the present” in Hölderlin’s last poetry (39), drawing attention precisely to the monopoly of the present indicative tense that I have already noted. Miles similarly writes that the poems are “lived out in the naked present, free from all tensions in time.”​[44]​ And Ryan also provides a helpful gloss,

[Noteworthy are] the monotony of form and theme, the lack of a sense of historical time, the almost exclusive use of present tense, the tensionlessness [in these poems]… It is above all in the total absence of historical consciousness that this transformation [from the hymns to the last poems] is most apparent. The same poet who once attempted to contain in his words a sweeping vision of the plan of history… [now] reflects the condition of ataraxia, a nearly complete acceptance of, and contentment with, the dispensation of things as the poet observes them. (345–6)

Hölderlin’s experience of time is that of the intemporal. Intemporality has no progress or decline, but merely successive and repeated moments of consummation. Each consummation may well be qualitatively different (for example, the four seasons are all complete in incomparable ways), but each is, on its own terms, equally consummate. 




Moreover, just as for Robinson, specific modes of poetic comportment follow directly from this new experience of time. The opening of a version of Der Frühling is representative in its stress on “der neue Tag” that descends (FA 9, 94). The poems constantly speak of a perpetual beginning in which all things appear fresh and new, a perspective of continual marvel and wonder. It is no surprise therefore that a common verb in the last poems is “sich wundern” – whether humans “sich wundern über manches / Sichtbares, Höheres, Angenehmes” in Wenn aus dem Himmel (FA 9, 67, lines 3–4) or humanity “wundert sich” at the return of “der Frühling… aus der Tiefe” in the 1758 Der Frühling reproduced above. The poem, Freundschaft, Liebe, begins by merely listing numerous objects to be found in a church – a list in which the poet’s wonder at the commonplace is particularly evident: “Freundschaft, Liebe, Kirch und Heilge, Kreuze, Bilder, / Altar und Kanzel und Muzik.”​[47]​ Such paratactic rhetoric mirrors the gaze of an enthusiastic child confronted with an excess of new objects: “this… and this… and this.” In a later poem, Der Ruhm, Hölderlin will speak of such everyday objects (in this case, “Der Garten, Baum, der Weinberg mit dem Hüter”) as “ein Wiederglanz des Himmels.”​[48]​ The most everyday item is a miracle.
	If a comportment of wonder follows from Hölderlin’s new conception of temporality, so too does a loss of all measure – at least human and divine measure. Note the list quoted above from Freundschaft, Liebe: Hölderlin begins with abstractions, but immediately switches register to concrete objects. “Freundschaft… und Kanzel” are placed in the same category; they are forced onto the same univocal plane, giving the impression of a loss of discrimination, an indifference to categorical differentiation. This is an impression confirmed in a version of Der Winter in which reality “erscheint besonders gut auf ungemeßner Weite.”​[49]​ Concomitant with time’s manifestation in discrete, self-perfected moments is an increasing failure to compare, discriminate and sets bounds on what appears. The present can only appear as present when it is no longer measured in terms of the past and the future. As Im Lieblicher Blau famously reads, “Giebt es auf Erden ein Maaß? Es giebt keines.”​[50]​ Thus, in addition to the desubjectivation consequent on building an asylum, the suppression of all measure is also a Hölderlinian practice that makes possible speculative transparency (i.e. the unenigmatic Erscheinung in Der Winter above).
	Discussion of measure in Hölderlin’s poetry cannot of course escape the long shadows cast by Heidegger, Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe; however, in the present context the most pertinent discussion is Fenves’ “Measure for Measure: Hölderlin and the Place of Philosophy” which reads into the hymns prior to 1806 this insistence on unmeasure. Fenves focuses on a line from Der Rhein, “Nur hat ein jeder sein Maas”​[51]​ contrasting it with (what he sees as) the self-defeating plea of Brot und Wein that measure is “allen gemein.”​[52]​ By means of this idea of each alone having its measure that is not common to anything else, Fenves develops a version of the incomparability of the affirmative moment found in Hölderlin’s last poems:

“Only each one” has its own criteria, which means that the criteria for something being what it is cannot be found in anything but the thing itself… The only place to seek the measure of each one is in “onliness” itself: in aloneness, in singularity.​[53]​

Just like the post-human time of the last poems, singularity of measure gives rise to an autarchy of the moment. Each is perfect on its own terms. Moreover, Fenves links this new experience of poetic time to the singularity of the poem itself: each poem is an affirmative, self-contained moment; each poem not only represents but performs its own completeness. The time of Hölderlin’s last poems should be named poetic time itself. (Philipsen 72) And, as such, it is poetic time that needs to be distinguished from the human time of linearity and the divine time of cycles. Or, as Fenves concludes his piece, “the other measure, the non-human one, is a measure of language’s contraction from the human-divine interplay.” (380) The time of language is neither the time of men nor the time of the gods; it is an inhuman saeculum that incarnates “the staying away of transcendence” (Haverkamp 100) – whether vertical or intersubjective.​[54]​


7.	A Logic of the Window
Hölderlin builds an asylum and within this retreat he is able to extinguish both himself and measure, leaving behind a transparent inscription of the plenitude of an intemporal, secularised present – a concentrated vision of the workings of nature. Yet, to perceive nature, to approach it and inscribe it, the “text-asylums” of the post-1806 output must, in some sense, retain an opening to the outside: they need a window. And of course the Tübingen tower’s most noteworthy feature is precisely such a window. This window plays an emblematic role in many of the biographical accounts of Hölderlin’s last years​[55]​ and, what is more, it materialises one of the key images of Hölderlin’s earlier thinking, which culminates in the famous 1802 letter to Böhlendorff: 

Die heimathliche Natur ergreift mich um so mächtiger, je mehr ich sie studiere. Das Gewitter, nicht blos in seiner höchsten Erscheinung, sondern in eben dieser Ansicht, als Macht und als Gestalt, in den übrigen Formen des Himmels, das Licht in seinem Wirken... sein Gang im Kommen und Gehen, das Charakteristische der Wälder und das Zusammentreffen in einer Gegend von verschiedenen Charakteren der Natur, daß alle heiligen Orte der Erde zusammen sind um einen Ort und das philosophische Licht um mein Fenster ist jetzt meine Freude.​[56]​

Once again, at stake here is a concentrated vision of nature (a gathering of natural places and elements) and the immanent joy this brings. Such a vision is now made possible by a window, rather than an asylum – or perhaps one should say: an asylum window. The transparency of the asylum window (i.e. the tower window) guarantees the inscription of the transparent. As Philipsen puts it,

Framed by the “view” from the tower window, which marks out the limited, transparent and untranscendable horizon of the Umnachten, [the poetry] thematises in a hard, cold present the image of the seasons. (13)





But what exactly is seen through the window? What forms the content of this “higher” perception? For to call it “nature” or “the world” is to brush over the precise features inscribed in the last poems, when – as we have already seen – these features are rather peculiar. This is a nature without dates, places or people; the objects that inhabit the landscape seen from the window are reduced to abstract nouns and recurrent stock images. Böschenstein compares “the magical concreteness of the hymns” to the “highest generality” that emerges here (38), as does Constantine:

Hölderlin either grew less and less able to realize vivid moments concretely in verse, or less interested in attempting it. Though most of the last poems take ostensibly a concrete subject – one or other of the seasons preferably – there is less and less in them that is actually seen… Instead, there are abstractions. (Hölderlin 309)​[57]​

Hamburger is perhaps the most vicious in his attacks: “The things of nature and human life… are so generalised and conventionalised that they become unreal”, giving rise to “the tritest rhyming of one dead thing with another.” (Hamburger 16, 48) Life is painted as a nature morte. And so once again we must ask: what in fact is seen through the asylum window?
	Let us take seriously Constantine’s begrudging hypothesis that Hölderlin loses interest in the world of concrete individuals and willingly replaces it with abstractions. The window abstracts, and so a concentrated perception of nature in itself is in fact a product of the practice of abstraction.​[58]​ And what is left behind after such a process is the surface and its phantasmal images. Hölderlinian abstraction is constitutive of the perverse phantasm. Something along these lines is intimated by Philipsen in the following passage:

The window is not merely of anecdotal significance. It marks that dark point at which the inner and the outer world oppose and repel each other, not however without leaving behind in images traces of their retreat into superficiality.​[59]​

The still-life of the last poems emerges out of an abstraction from the object and an extinction of the subject. Both poles of the correlation are neutralised in a “neither… nor…” structure. What is left is a degree zero of poetry, the textual surface itself. Hölderlin’s last poetry is superficial to the letter.
Of course, this is to admit that the poems still result from a denial of the concrete world, and it is hardly surprising that many critics have concluded with Constantine, “The world is not like that, and such harmony is only possible in poetry not engaging with it.” (Hölderlin 312) Yet, it is absolutely crucial to concede that Hölderlin does fail to engage with this form of the world, that he proposes instead a utopia.​[60]​ That is, Hölderlin’s last poems converge with the very definition of utopia offered by Marin as “the discursive expression of the neutral (defined as ‘neither one nor the other’ of contraries).”​[61]​ Hölderlinian abstraction is a utopic practice.​[62]​
As we know, the last poems eschew place-names and concrete geography; they de-situate themselves in a no-place which is also a good-place (to be cheerfully affirmed). What is more, the contraries of subject and object are reciprocally neutralised, such that this no-place ultimately forms an impossible surface.​[63]​ This surface is indifferent and a-thetic, thereby resistant to the dialectical ruses of contradiction and negation; indeed, Hölderlin’s utopic poetry is a-Hegelian, insisting on the indifference of affirmation, on the intemporality of plenitude and the in-conscious production of abstract particulars (or phantasms – rather than concrete universals).​[64]​ Marin expresses this resistance to the dialectic through the figure of the zero, indifferent to the instable play of number, prior to judgment (xvii–xix, 7). If Hölderlin’s hymns and elegies compulsively repeat the Greek forgetting of “0” (like Hegel’s and Heidegger’s philosophies after them), Hölderlin’s post-1806 poetry (re)establishes a utopic principle: “The zero has its own force.” (14)
	Hence, Hölderlinian abstraction establishes a poetics of the neuter, and this constitution of the neuter through abstraction can best be recaptured in an image from Wenn aus der Ferne:

Aber die Nahmen der seltnen Orte
Und alles Schöne hatt’ er behalten, das
An seeligen Gestaden, auch mir sehr werth
Im heimatlichen Lande blühet
Oder verborgen, aus hoher Aussicht,
Allwo das Meer auch einer beschauen kann,
Doch keiner seyn will. Nehme vorlieb...​[65]​
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